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Abstract 
In this project, we discuss the phenomenon of UAV warfare. By 
conducting a discourse analysis of two speeches, one held by then 
counterterrorism advisor John Brennan and one by President Barack 
Obama, we investigate how UAV use is justified. We briefly discuss the 
historical background and contemporary public opinion in order to 
contextualize the discourse presented in the two speeches. The discourse 
analysis is structured in three analytical categories: how representations of 
identity are articulated, how the speakers make claims about the future and 
finally the specific nature of the justifications of UAV use. Finally, we 
discuss how our empirical findings relate to the discussion of the changing 
nature of warfare, as well as we present a brief critique of a position in the 
current UAV debate. Our main argument in this discussion is that UAVs 
should be discussed within the social, discursive practice they are used, and 
not regarded merely as technological objects distinct from the context they 
exist in. 
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Research Field and Questions 
The debate of just war might be as old as war itself. Debates about when, why, how 
and by whom military action should be applied, are inextricably linked to the nature 
of warfare itself. When new phenomena connected to military conflict emerge, they 
are interpreted and explained following traditions of how to understand and justify 
warfare. The American government’s use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to 
target terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan - amongst other places – is no different. 
It might be understood as a natural development in the war on terror, pursuing 
terrorist non-state actors wherever they hide, while minimizing American casualties. 
In this regard, UAVs are simply a technological extension of previous military 
efforts (see for instance the report Dronerne er her: Hvad er de strategiske, retlige 
og etiske konsekvenser (2013) byAnders Henriksen and Jens Ringsmose).  
Another perspective is that the use of UAVs represents a break with traditional 
understandings of warfare. In this view, the “robotization” of war presents 
previously unseen moral, ethical and practical implications. In a typological view of 
warfare, UAVs might be argued to challenge traditional (as well as new) 
conceptions of who the actors in military conflicts are, how state sovereignty 
matters, how transparency, domestic support and legality takes form, as well as how 
military conflict is justified (for this perspective, see for instance Peter.W. Singer’s 
Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century). 
It is especially the last point – justification - we wish to discuss in this project. We 
believe that the justifications of UAV use are co-constitutive with the application of 
them, and that the structure of the justifications of UAV use is inextricably linked to 
the possible interpretations of UAVs as a phenomenon. We will elaborate further on 
this perspective later in the report. By conducting a discourse analysis of two 
important speeches in this regard – one by Assistant to the President for Homeland 
Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan and one by US president Barack 
Obama – we wish to investigate the structure of UAV justifications. John Brennan’s 
speech is the first official speech regarding the Administration’s use of UAVs and 
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Obama’s speech is the first presidential speech addressing UAV use, specifically 
putting it into context of the Administration’s counter-terrorism strategy1. 
This project aims to contextualize the justifications of UAVs with regards to 
traditions of justifying military action. In terms of American foreign policy, the use 
of UAVs follows the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and is a part of the War on 
Terror. Arguably, it is also a part of a broader, systemic change in the nature of 
warfare, sometimes referred to as (part of) the change from Old Wars to New Wars, 
where traditional conceptualizations of war time, peace time, implicated actors and 
goals and means of military conflicts are re-defined (see Kaldor 2007 for this 
argument). 
Further on, the project seeks to conceptualize the justifications of UAV use. We 
wish to investigate the structure of the arguments made for UAV application. In 
order to understand the role of UAVs in American foreign policy, we seek to 
analyze the underlying premises, the constructions of the enemy and the meta-
narratives regarding UAVs.  
Finally, we wish to discuss what our analytical findings can contribute to the 
discussion on whether certain characteristics of UAVs are challenging the 
traditional concepts of warfare. As such, our research questions in this project are as 
follows:  
• In which historical context of US foreign policy and justification of 
warfare are the two speeches placing UAV use? 
• How is the use of UAVs justified by the American government? 
• To what extent does the discourse of UAV use challenge traditional 
concepts of warfare? 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!1 Videos of the two speeches can be found at: John O. Brennan: 
www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy, Barack 
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What We Can Know: Ontology and Epistemology in 
Constructivist International Relations Studies  
 
“Tlön is surely a labyrinth, but it is a labyrinth devised by men, a labyrinth destined 
to be deciphered by men” Jorge Luis Borges, Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Teritus, 1962 
All studies within the social sciences beg (more than) a few questions on the process 
and purpose of the research. Which empirical phenomenon can be approached? 
What is the nature of the knowledge we aspire to achieve? How do we approach our 
empirical observations? And what is the validity of our research? 
The focus of our research is how the American government justifies use of UAVs, 
how this justification relates to previous justifications of military conflict and 
whether the UAVs represent a challenge to traditional understandings of warfare. 
These questions themselves presuppose a few premises: 1) that the justifications of 
UAVs are subject to agency; the justifications do not exist without someone 
producing them, 2) that the justifications are somehow structured following 
previous justifications of warfare, recognizing that they are produced within certain 
understandings of what constitutes meaningful justifications and 3) that 
justifications matter, because the norms and ideals put forward by the involved 
actors are intrinsically linked with  the production of policies. 
These assumptions follow the constructivist research tradition in the studies of IR. 
Constructivists challenge classical IR-theories of science - where structural 
approaches such as Realism, Liberalism or Marxism have traditionally dominated - 
by rejecting the notion that scientific inquiry should seek to uncover universal 
regularities and mechanisms that govern the social sphere in which people act 
(Klotz & Lynch 2007: 3ff). Instead the social world is viewed as consisting of 
interpretations of a social reality, where such interpretations are at all times 
contingent and conditioned by certain social, cultural and historical contexts (ibid.) 
Even though the constructivist research field in itself is diverse, with varying 
ontological and epistemological definitions, generally the “Constructivists see 
“security” as a relationship historically conditioned by culture rather than an 
objective characteristic determined by the distribution of military capabilities” 
(Klotz & Lynch 2007: 17). Hansen states that politics require identities, “but 
! 8!
identities do not exist as objective accounts of what people and places ‘really are’, 
but as continuously restated, negotiated and reshaped subjects and objects” 
(Hansen 2007: 17). 
 
These restatings, negotiations and reshapings happen within certain discourses, 
frames of how a certain subject can be understood (Hodges 2011: 6). In a 
Foucauldian sense, these discourses are “forms of knowledge, or powerful sets of 
assumptions, expectations and explanations governing mainstream social and 
cultural practices” (Baxter 2003: 7). As such, our enquiry about the justification of 
use of UAVs regards the assumptions, expectations and explanations that govern 
practice of UAV use.  
 
Ontology and epistemology 
Every person acts within a (lot of) social sphere(s), where structures of norms, 
meanings and ideas are reproduced as they are enacted (Klotz & Lynch 2007: 3). 
Simultaneously, however “people consciously and unintentionally replicate and 
challenge institutionalized routines and prevailing assumptions” (ibid.: 7). As such, 
phenomena in the social sphere are subject to agency, and are both constitutive and 
constituted as they are reproduced. Therefore, agents and structures are co-
constitutive when producing representations of reality and it is difficult to say that 
agents cause structures or that structures cause agents. Lene Hansen discusses 
criticism of IR-constructivism, and that traditional scholars tend to skeptically 
demand that constructivists should “show me your discourse matters and how 
much” (Hansen 2007: 10). However, Hansen argues, it is an impossible question 
within the constructivist framework, because of the performative, non-causal link 
between identity and policy (Hansen 2007: 8). 
In relation to the discourses surrounding UAVs, it means that from our 
epistemological stance, the justification of UAV use matters not because we can 
determine that the discourses on the justness of UAVs has a tangible, discernible 
impact on the policy implemented, but because there exists no policy free from 
discursive interpretations and reproductions of identity and norms. The discussion 
of causal epistemologies is a massive and complex one, and we do not intend to 
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contribute much to it here, as this is not the purpose of this enquiry. Our research 
design does not hold promises of causal claims, and instead we subscribe to a 
discursive epistemology, drawing on Klotz’ and Lynch’s points on constructivist 
research: 
 
“[…] language, meaning, symbols, culture, discourse – all the intersubjective 
phenomena at the heart of constructivist ontology – remain vital components of 
[constructivist analysis]. People’s reasoning processes, both through instrumental 
calculations and moral arguments, remain empirical issues to be investigated with a 
range of appropriate methodological tools” (Klotz & Lynch 2007: 16). 
 
While “all forms of meaningful semiotic human activity” can be subject to 
constructivist analysis, our decision is to approach the use of language, specifically 
as a social practice, in which meanings are reflected and replicated (Hodges & 
Nilep 2007: 4). Specifically, our choice to approach the use of UAVs within the 
framework of discourse analysis is following Lene Hansen’s analysis of the 
discourses concerning Bosnian War (Hansen 2007), Adam Hodges’ discourse 
analysis of “The War on Terror Narrative” (Hodges 2011) and Patricia L. 
Dunmire’s discourse analysis of preemptive warfare (Hodges & Nilep 2007).  
 
Research Focus 
Extensive research has been made into the discourses of The War on Terror, where 
the analysis has been focused on subjects such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the connection between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda and the justifications of 
preemptive wars (see for instance Hodges 2011 or Hodges & Nilep 2007). The 
project aims to follow these enquiries and apply a comparable methodology to 
investigate the discourse of UAVs in the American foreign policy. As Hodges puts 
it: “By examining the formation and circulation of such powerful narratives, we 
gain insight into the social effects that text production and circulation can have in 
sustaining regimes of truth and producing real world actions” (Hodges 2011: 6).  
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These “powerful narratives” about UAVs are comprised of essential elements that 
structure the discourses (Hodges 2011:18). When deciding on the analytical 
approach to a text, we decide a certain perspective on the structure of these 
elements. Because “[…] a view from nowhere does not exist […]”, choosing a 
certain perspective naturally excludes other perspectives” (Hodges & Nilep (eds.) 
2007: 4). Throughout the project, we will argue that focusing on three analytical 
categories of the UAV discourse, will provide a clear and concise (though, of 
course, not exhaustive) mapping of UAV justifications. 
These three are the representations of (1) a Self and of Others and (2) claims of 
the future, how scenarios of the future are presented as well as (3) specifically how 
the justifications of UAVs are constructed. These three discursive structures are the 
main foci in our analysis. 
 
Additionally, we give extra analytical attention to the interpretations of history in 
the speeches. Discourse is essentially a phenomenon with historical characteristics 
(Klotz & Lynch 2007: 24). It is not possible for meaningful norms, structures and 
ideas to suddenly appear out of the blue, instead discourses develop as they are 
represented: “[…] the production and reception of the Narrative, as with any text 
that accrues into a shared cultural narrative, cannot take place unless it is subject 
to an iterative process – an intertextuality – whereby it is reinscribed across 
different interactional contexts” (Hodges 2011: 8). These references or 
interpretations if you will, of previous texts automatically carry along facets of the 
original meaning, but are recontextualized and transformed in the new context 
(ibid.). Therefore, it is an important feature of the structure of the UAV discourse, 
to investigate how the texts (re)interpret themselves in relation to previous texts – 
how representations of history are put forward. 
 
Klotz and Lynch argue that the co-constitutive features of identity and policy are 
relational – identities and policies are only meaningful in relation to other identities 
(Klotz and Lynch 2007: 65). When security policies present threat scenarios, they 
automatically demarcate different groupings. As Hansen puts it, one characteristic 
of formulations of policy is for instance that “[…] foreign policy discourse always 
articulates a Self and a series of Others” (Hansen 2007: 6). Therefore, being able to 
discern the essence ascribed to representations of the self and of the others, can 
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reveal important discursive structures in the construction of justifications. In 
discourse analysis, this point is significant. Oftentimes, certain interests are 
attributed to different groups, but from our theoretical stance“[i]dentities are the 
basis of interests. Actors do not have a "portfolio" of interests that they carry 
around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the 
process of defining situation” (Wendt 1992: 9).  
 
Furthermore, we wish to discuss how different scenarios of the future are 
represented in the discourses. Such representations of the possibilities of the future 
are important articulations because: “Indeed, creating representations of “what 
people can be led to expect of the future” is an especially potent means by which 
political actors shape the political cognitions and behavior of large numbers of 
people” (Dunmire in Hodges & Nilep (eds.) 2007: 22). When scenarios of the future 
are put forward, they guide the present political debate and agenda. It is especially 
interesting to analyze the modalities of how the scenarios are represented: how 
much certainty is ascribed to a scenario, who are the actors in the scenario and what 
is the nature of their agency? 
 
The final chapter of the analysis is concerned with how the representations of 
identity and the claims of the future (as well as how these discursive structures are 
founded in interpretations of history) are used to justify UAV use. Specifically how 
arguments of ethicality, efficacy and legality are put forward in the speeches.  
 
We argue that these three analytical categories offer an extensive insight into the 
different dimensions of the discourse and therefore, the structure of the 
justifications of UAV use. When analyzing the speeches, these analytical categories 
will guide us. 
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Methodology: Approaching the Discourses 
“Then we tried a hundred yards to the mile. And then came the grandest idea of all! 
We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a mile to the mile!” 
“Have you used it much?” I enquired.”  
Lewis Carrol, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded, 1893. 
 
Choosing the texts: Primary empirical data 
The empirical data used in this project counts two speeches held respectively by 
John O. Brennan Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and President Barack 
Obama. Together the two speeches directly address the US security policy on 
counterterrorism with focus on the UAV program. In order to be able to complete a 
textual analysis we have acquired the remarks of John Brennan’s speech and the 
transcript of Barack Obamas speech (Appendix 1 & 2). In order to test the reliability 
of the transcript and the remarks, we chose to include the video recordings of the 
two speeches in our analysis. We did, however, only discover very few deviations 
in Brennan’s scripted remarks, and what he actually said. The inclusion of the 
videos however has additional purposes, as we believe they can provide us with 
supplementary insight in how the points and arguments in the two speeches were 
delivered. The video recordings for us hold valid meaning and provide useful 
understanding of body language, and which words that where given extra emphasis 
and volume. We give special notice to the way John O. Brennan and Barack Obama 
presents their speeches, as the videos arguably, unlike the transcript and the 
remarks, are what the majority of the audience has viewed – and were intended to 
view. While we are interested in the language and arguments in the texts, we are 
aware that phonetics and gesticulation as well are part of a given discourse and can 
be subject to analysis. In Hodges’ The War on Terror Narrative, for instance he 
analyzes presidential speeches by George W. Bush and emphasizes intonation, 
pauses and phonetic elements. We recognize the analysis of gesticulation and 
oratorical elements as a vast field within the traditions of discourse analysis. These 
elements will not drive our analysis, but we have been aware of how these 
analytical methods can supplement our analysis. 
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First, our choice to include John O. Brennan speech titled “The Ethics and Efficacy 
of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy”. Brennan initially explains that he 
gives his speech on the request from Barack Obama. As the title depicts, the speech 
is centred on the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, and throughout the speech Brennan 
touches upon the use of UAVs and as well as its legality, efficacy and ethics.  There 
are two main reasons why we have chosen this speech as subject to our discourse 
analysis. First, our initial research study showed that the speech was one of the very 
first publically and official statements on the use of UAV. This is supported by both 
New York Times which described the event as “[the Obama administration’s] first 
extensive explanation of how American officials decide when to use drones to kill 
suspected terrorists” (Savage 2012: NY Times). BBC equally addressed the 
originality of the speech when entitling their article on the subject “White House in 
first detailed comments on drone strikes” (Mardell 2012: BBC). Secondly, we chose 
this particular speech due to the importance that John O. Brennan at that time, and 
still today, had/has in the formulation of the U.S. counterterrorism policy. By the 
time that he gave the speech, he was functioning as counterterrorism advisor for 
Obama. His full title was Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism and Assistant to the President. As of writing, December 2013, 
John O. Brennan serves as Director of CIA, which is one of the two institutions, the 
other being the U.S. military, who has the ability to use UAVs abroad.2  
Our second source of empirical data is another speech on U.S. drone and 
counterterror policy, (as entitled by the White House in the transcript), given by 
President Barack Obama at the National Defence University May 23 this year. In 
the speech, Obama addresses the counterterrorism strategy, the use of UAVs and 
towards the end also the situation of Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp.  
The choice of Barack Obama’s speech is important given his presidency and his 
vital position in the decision making of U.S. foreign policy. It is Obama’s legal right 
that gives him the final and decisive vote on whether or not a UAV strike should be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Friend Committee on National Legislation: 
http://fcnl.org/issues/foreign_policy/understanding_drones/. 
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initiated as a response to a terrorist threat3. In our desk study we found that this was 
the first presidential speech on counterterrorism and UAV use. It has also been 
described as “[…] the first major speech on counterterrorism of his second term 
and announced a shift in his administration’s use of drones” (NY Times 2013).  
Additionally, surveys regarding U.S. public opinion towards the use of UAVs have 
been included in this project. We have chosen to do so, because we find it important 
to include the public attitude as the context in which the speeches were held. 
Meaning is being constructed collectively and identity and foreign policy is 
constituted simultaneously, therefore the public perception of the narratives 
presented in the speeches is essential to investigate (Hansen 2007: 7). While this is 
not our main focus in this project and therefore it is not our intention to investigate 
this exhaustively, we do, however, find it relevant as background knowledge for the 
reader and ourselves. This is why the paragraph describing the public opinion is 
presented before our analysis. More practically, we make use of two surveys 
conducted by Pew Research Center and Gallup. The benefits, limitations and the 
validity of these surveys are equally addressed in the chapter about public opinions. 
 
Juxtapositions, linking and differentiation  
It is our position that discourses articulate construction of identities. One way of 
identifying a construction of a certain identity is to look for juxtapositions. 
Whenever one determines what a specific phenomenon is, a simultaneous 
description of what it is not is made: 
“To say that meaning is constructed through the discursive juxtaposition 
between a privileged sign on the one hand and a devalued one on the other 
leads to a conceptualization of identity in relational terms and as being 
constructed along two dimensions” (Laclau & Mouffe: 1985 in Hansen 
2007: 19). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Public Law 107-40: Authorization for Use of Military Force. 107th Congress. September 
18, 2001. United States Congress. Available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. 
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In order to be able to map the juxtapositions present in our empirical data we adopt 
a model of linking and differentiating presented by Lene Hansen. The positive 
process of linking means that a given phenomenon is linked with 
characteristics/attributes. The negative process of differentiation is on the other 
hand a simultaneous process of defining what juxtaposes the phenomenon (Hansen 
2007: 19). 
   Hansen uses the model to exemplify how a “woman” is defined through a positive 
process of linking of four characteristics (emotional, motherly, simple and reliant) 
but at the same time described through a negative process of differentiation to what 
defines a “man” (rational, intellectual, complex and independent) (Hansen 2007: 
20).  
If we translate and elevate this approach into a more general model for the sake of 
our project’s focus, the model for mapping juxtapositions and the inherent processes 
of linking and differentiation could be illustrated as such:  
Phenomena, 1, ascribed with characteristics A, B, C, & D             
Differentiated from 
Phenomena 2, ascribed with characteristics E, F, G, & H 
In the model, characteristics A, B, C & D are linked with each other and 
differentiated from characteristics E, F, G & H, which are also linked. The model 
serves an illustrative and mapping purpose, as to give both reader and researcher an 
overview of the identities identified in the discourse. We will use this model in the 
first chapter of our analysis. It is important to note, that the model could have 
contained more than four defining characteristics, but the limit of four makes the 
model more manageable. 
 
Display 
We wish to present our empirical findings in a convenient design that is to avoid 
that our presented data only appears as quotations in the analysis and discussion. 
The risk of not doing so can be that both the researcher and the reader trust their 
interpretation on intuition (Dahler-Larsen 2008: 41f). We aim to raise the validity 
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and transparency further by constructing a display which aims to present all relevant 
comments and notes including anomalies within a specific category (ibid.). We are 
to map a discourse and see clear strengths of creating this matrix that holds the 
categories, which structures our analysis (the Self and the Others, claim to the future 
and justifications). The display presents the coding of our empirical data, and to 
give a more exhaustive display over which arguments our analysis is founded on. 
Additionally, we wish to avoid that our textual analysis is read as a fragmented 
representation of our empirical data, and thus try to present the texts in an 
approachable fashion. We do this to make it transparent for readers of this project 
which recurring themes are basis for our analysis and discussion. The following two 
pages will present our display, where our empirical data is organized in the three 
mentioned analytical categories.   
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What We Can’t Know: The Limitations and Boundaries of the 
Project 
 
Empirical limitations 
Some limits to our empirical base needs to be addressed. In “The ‘War on Terror’ 
Narrative” author Adam Hodges presents his constructivist study on the discourse 
of the War on Terror narrative. Hodges study draws upon three sources of empirical 
data. A comprehensive amount of public political speeches, 70, and a broad 
selection of media narratives and lastly Hodges conducted focus group interviews 
with 26 politically involved college students (Hodges 2011). We acknowledge the 
clear benefits of interviews that could have supported our empirical data 
significantly while complementing our discourse document analysis with a 
triangulation of our methodological approach. Even though we recognise that this 
methodological approach could have aided our study we were not able to carry out 
focus group interviews due to limited resources and the timeframe of this project. 
We want to clarify that it is our argument that the understanding of foreign policy, 
both needs to encompass and locate, if present, representations of discourses that 
either reinforce or contest each other in a broad framework that also counts the 
media, the public, NGOs and academia along official agents of U.S. foreign policy. 
This is given great attention by Hansen, and she stress:  
“Some foreign policy questions are less contested than others, leading to less 
diversity in term of the representations argued […] But, such a hegemonic situation 
might also be seen as worthy of an extensive study of non-governmental sources in 
as much as this generates important knowledge of the way in which governmental 
representations are dispersed and reproduced” (Hansen 2007: 7f). 
 
Through our desk study, a coherent and consistent challenging discourse criticizing 
the legal and ethical basis for the use of UAVs was detected. The discourse has 
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been raised by leading humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch4 
and Amnesty International5, that both report findings which put emphasis on the 
legal as well as moral and ethical complications that UAV brings about.  The 
International Crisis Group along the same path reported similar concern with the 
legality, effectiveness and the civilian casualties in the CIA targeted killings in 
Pakistan.6 We present these reports here to explicitly acknowledge that we are 
aware that challenging discourses and representations indeed are present and 
produced. In a further study within this area it would have been relevant to include 
as subject to the same analytical tools. However, this alternate discourse is not in 
the focus of this project. Instead we focus on the official UAV discourse produced 
by the agents that are executive in the UAVs use.  
 !  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Available at: www.hrw.org/reports/2013/10/22/between-drone-and-al-qaeda-0 
5 Available at: www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/security-and-human-rights/drones 
6 Available at: www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/247-drones-myths-
and-reality-in-pakistan.aspx!
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A Brief History of War Justifications: The Historical Context 
of UAV use 
 
This paragraph will touch upon IR theory, international law, and different scholarly 
interpretations and conceptualisations of war, and how war and military action 
previously have been justified. This is done in order to give an overview of the 
context UAV use is placed within. 
 
Which Comes First, War or Peace? 
That war is an inevitable part of human life might appear to be a distressing 
perspective, but it is arguably the first theoretical concept of war to be formed. This 
theoretical stance on the conceptualisation of war holds that war is ontologically 
prior to peace. The nature of being human is constituted by conflict and aspiration 
for positions of power and resources. This makes violence predictable, and several 
scholars including Hobbes and Marx have articulated these stances. (Crone 2013: 
229). Yet, another theoretical stance claims that peace is prior to war, since peace is 
the end of war. Immanuel Kant advocated perpetual peace as a normative idea. An 
idea founded on the premise that war and the probability of violence is intrinsically 
related to the nature of the states’ political regime and that the Republican State can 
help overcome anarchy and maintain peace (ibid.). This notion of an inherent 
peacefulness in certain regime types was a precursor the observation that 
democratic states apparently are less prone to engage in war with each other. These 
two opposing stances have been within the theoretical field of international relations 
and formed diverse positions within the realist and liberal paradigms. It has also 
significantly affected how justification of war is to be interpreted. A general 
justification of war, accepting the premise of violence and conflict as an inherent 
part of human nature, is very different from a justification that aims to justify the 
means as having an end with emphasis on peace.  
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Old Wars 
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is often referred to as the end of religious wars 
and the beginning of the modern period of war (Crone 2013: 230ff). The basic 
premise of the modern period of war was that warfare was inter-state, an organised 
form of violence fought out among sovereign entities:  
“War is not, therefore, a relation between man and man, but between state and 
state, in which private individuals are enemies only by accident, not as men, nor 
even as citizens, but as soldiers”  (Rousseau, 1978: 50 in Crone 2013) 
The modern period of war was seen as a system of states concerned with power, 
interest or territory. This can arguably also be said to have influenced the scholars 
of International Relations of the time with the predominant realist paradigm 
depicting an international system of anarchy, driven by self-interest, and with great 
preoccupation with the intentions of other states. International law and the modern 
war paradigm can be said to confirm a state centric focus, meaning that the state is 
the primary actor and denominator in the international system as well as in warfare. 
Mary Kaldor has made this useful table of the evolution of Old Wars: 
Table 1.1 – The Evolution of Old Wars 
Table 
2.1 
The evolution of 
Old Wars 
   
 17th and 18th 
centuries 
19th century Early 20th 
century 
Late 20th 
century 
Type of 
polity 
Absolutist state Nation-state Coalition of 
states; 
multinational 
states; empires 
Blocs  
Goals 
of war 
Reasons of state; 
dynastic conflict; 
consolidation of 
borders 
National conflict National and 
ideological 
conflict 
Ideological 
conflict 
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Type of 
army 
Mercenary/professi
onal 
Professional/cons
cription 
Mass armies Scientific-
military 
elite/professio
nal armies 
Military 
techniq
ue 
Use of firearm, 
defensive 
manoeuvres, sieges 
Railways and 
telegraph, rapid 
mobilization 
Massive 
firepower; 
tanks and 
aircraft 
Nuclear 
weapons 
War 
econom
y 
Regularization of 
taxation and 
borrowing 
Expansion of 
administration 
and bureaucracy 
Mobilization, 
economy 
Military-
industrial 
complex 
 
The table (Kaldor 2007: 16) gives a practical overview of the evolution of war, 
displaying different types of military force, strategy and means, but it also shows a 
general tendency that forms the notion of war during that time: ”[…] despite these 
differences, war was recognizably the same phenomenon: a construction of the 
centralized, ‘rationalized’, hierarchically ordered, territorialized modern state” 
(Kaldor 2007: 17). This confirms the state-centric focus, and that the modern war 
period was closely linked to the development and evolution of the modern state.  
   But what about violence that is not inter-state, but executed by non-state actors as 
well as states? “Wars of today increasingly involve non-state actors – terrorists, 
insurgents, guerrillas – and are fought in contexts, where the state is in decay” 
(Crone 2913: 238). Mary Kaldor, who addresses the problem that “Actual warfare 
never exactly fitted the stylized description”, recognizes this dilemma. She 
challenges the description of rebellions and guerrilla wars as being something 
exclusively postmodern, but instead stress that they have always been present, but 
never fitted the notion of war in the modern period. “Instead, they were called 
uprisings, insurgencies or, more recently, low-intensity conflicts. Nevertheless, it is 
the stylized notion of war that still profoundly affects our thinking about war and 
dominates, even today, the way policy –makers conceive of security” (Kaldor 2007: 
17f). To investigate the changing nature of armed conflict we include a figure 
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composed by statistical data provided by The Conflict Data Program. 7 The figure 
below shows a clear increase in armed conflict types of intrastate from 1946-2012. 
Figure 1.1 – Armed Conflict by Type, 1946-2012 
 
The tendency the figure displays is in contrast to the conception of war bound to 
states only. The notion of Old Wars – wars between two sovereign states on 
spatially and temporally defined battlegrounds - is simply insufficient to explain the 
changing nature of violent conflicts (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 72ff). 
 
New Wars 
New Wars is a notion that in line with the above tendency in armed conflicts 
challenge the traditional conceptions of what defines war, and instead tend to focus 
to make the conceptualisation more comprehensive in encompassing contemporary 
conflicts. Mary Kaldor notes that central concepts, in the previous presented 
typology have changed significantly. First is the question about who the actors are? 
“New wars are fought by varying combinations of networks of state and non-state 
actors – regular armed forces, private security contractors, mercenaries, jihadists, 
warlords, paramilitaries, etc.” (Kaldor 2013)8. To this, we would like to add that 
actors are also often transnational or regional coalitions, who engage in military !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Data set is available at: 
www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/ 
8 www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.at/41!
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action – for instance under a UN mandate to humanitarian intervention - as well as 
non-governmental actors increasingly are playing key roles in conflicts. Second, the 
New Wars are often fought about identity, whether it is religious, tribal of ethnic 
character. The fight is focused on acquiring the ability to exercise power within a 
state while asserting the interest of identity/groups “The aim is to gain access to the 
state for particular groups (that may be both local and transnational) rather than to 
carry out particular policies or programmes in the broader public interest” (ibid.). 
New Wars are also often asymmetric in terms of combatants and technology, and 
the disputants might fight with very different means, and not necessarily over 
territory, but for political reasons. Guerrilla tactics, terrorist attacks and fights 
carried out, not in large battlefields, but in local villages and city sites. This puts 
civilian lives at great risk, either risking their life in hostage situations or as 
hostages simply in the sense that the battlefield has become very local. While New 
Wars are often concerned with being able to aptly describe the wars that are not 
happening between great powers, but it is also a framework that can be used to 
understand the War on Terror, for instance. It is an example of a security strategy 
that both deal with a different type of actor as enemy, and also challenge the 
traditional definitions of what delineates battlegrounds. Risk management has also 
become a core concept in U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the 
War on Terror (see. Coker 2009, Rasmussen 2006, Heng 2006 and Armoore & De 
Goede 2008).  
States have been deeply concerned with other states’ intentions, and therefore tried 
to balance the perceived threats. Often this implied alliance formation described by 
Stephen Walt as “formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between 
two or more states” (Walt 1997: 157). These alliances are formed as responses to 
perceived threats and the intention of other states.  
Yet, we argue that this is still relevant in contemporary international relations. The 
concern with other states’ intentions has not gone away, but has become greatly 
interconnected with the perceived threat, or risk, posed by terrorists, a risk that got 
confirmed tragically by the terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon on 
September 11th, 2001. This was a clear turning point in the discourse of U.S. 
Foreign policy and fostered the War on Terror narrative (Hodges & Nilep 2007 and 
Hodges 2011). U.S found legal justifications in the international law, more precisely 
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in the United Nation Charter, article 51, given states the right to act in self-defence. 
“Nowadays, it does seem to have become widely accepted that the use of force is 
only justifiable either in self-defence or if it is sanctioned by the international 
community – in particular, the UN Security Council” (Kaldor 2007: 29f). U.S. 
national law was equally transformed to encompass terrorist threats, and to lay the 
ground for justification of preceding action.  
“[…] the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harboured such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons”9 
The paradigm of New Wars is more global in the sense that it makes a critique of 
the U.S. and European perspective of Old Wars. In this way New Wars include 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East to a far greater degree (Crone 2013: 238). These 
are important this enquiry because U.S. foreign policy seek to fight out a war on Al-
Qaida, who has its activity parts of the world that the New War perspective 
includes. It is in these areas where UAVs are being used and is part of a pre-emptive 
warfare. After a war in Afghanistan and a war in Iraq, the US government is still 
fighting a War on Terror, albeit with new means. This is the context in which UAVs 
are used. As previously mentioned, this project will not explicitly discuss competing 
or alternate discourses on the use of UAVs. We do, however, feel it is important to 
present some data on the public environment in which the speeches are held. The 
point is not to present an in depth analysis of the public opinion on UAVs, but 
rather to give an idea of the general attitudes on the subject. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Public Law 107-40: Authorization for Use of Military Force. 107th Congress. September 
18, 2001. United States Congress. Available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf.  !
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Public Opinion on UAVs 
This paragraph is to give a brief overview over the public opinion on UAV use in 
the US including different sources of data.  Figure 1.2 – Public Opinion 
   Our first source of information is the   
Pew Research Center (PRC), a self 
proclaimed “nonpartisan fact tank” 10 
that carries out US public opinion polls 
and demographic surveys. A discussion 
of PRC and the usage of their data can 
be found in previous studies of the war 
on terrorism (see Hodges 2011 and 
Hodges & Nilep 2007). 
PRC’s findings, published in July 2013, 
show that 61 % of the informants 
approve of U.S. drone strikes 11 . The 
findings also show that out of the 
surveyed 38 states and the Palestine 
territory, apart from the U.S., it is only in 
Israel (64%) and in Kenya (56%) that 
more than half of the population support 
the use12.  
   In order to raise the validity of these 
findings, we sought to find other source 
of information and surveys on public 
opinions towards the use of drones. 
Gallup, in March 2013, published a 
comprehensive survey on public opinion showing that 65% of Americans support !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 www.pewresearch.org/about/ 
11 While we generally stick to the term “UAVs”, we use “drones” in this chapter, because it 
is the preferred term of our sources 
12 www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/chapter-1-attitudes-toward-the-united-states/#drone-
strikes!
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drone attacks on terrorist in other countries (Gallup 2013). Gallup also finds 
differences in opinion based on party identification showing that to “Launch 
airstrikes in other countries against suspected terrorist abroad” is supported by 
79% of Republicans, 61% by Independents and 55% by Democrats (ibid.). 
This survey confirms the PRC’s findings. It is, however, our argument that one 
should always be attentive to what people are actually asked in quantitative studies, 
and in the case of PRC’s survey, the question is whether the informants either 
approve or disapprove the American drone campaign against extremist leaders and 
organizations. This question is concerned with terrorists in foreign countries, but 
Gallup on the other hand include various questions that strive to investigate the 
public attitude more widely, hence their interest in the use of drones on against U.S. 
citizens and on U.S. territory. Gallup finds that a majority of Americans do not 
support attacks if they are on U.S. citizens suspected for terrorism living abroad or 
suspected terrorists, either U.S. citizens or not, who live in the U.S. (Gallup 2013). 
Figure 1.3 – Public Opinion 2 
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Hansen points to “The conceptualization of identity as discursive, political, 
relational, and social implies that foreign policy discourse always articulates a Self 
and a series of Others” (Hansen 2007: 6). This is highly interesting in the light of 
the two surveys. Both show support for the use of drones when the target is 
suspected of terrorist activities and allegedly in affiliation with a major terrorist 
organization. It is therefore arguably a representation of the Self and an Other, with 
the American people as the Self and terrorists or terrorist organisations 
characterising the Other. That might also explain the clear reluctance surveyed by 
Gallup towards targeting U.S. citizen abroad and drone strikes on American turf. 
Maybe the public attitude reacts to the discourse of “terrorist” as a political 
representation that defines what the self is not.  
The polls put forward in this paragraph show a noteworthy insight in the American 
public social beliefs and understandings. The surveys clearly illustrate a widespread 
national acceptance and legitimisation of UAV use. It is within this context the 
American government’s discourse on UAVs is developed. The two speeches of 
Barack Obama and John O. Brennan are, as mentioned, the first elaborate comments 
on UAV use by the Administration, and while opposing discourses exist, the 
speeches are placed within a generally supportive public sphere. 
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Analysis: The UAV Discourse 
 
In the following, we will analyse the two speeches. As explained, we will examine 
the speeches through three overall analytical categories: the articulations of 
identities, the claims of the future and the specific justifications of UAV use. 
Throughout the analysis, we will specifically focus on how history is 
intertextualized, how authority and knowledge is established as well as how 
different meanings are established and stabilized through their relational links. 
Analysis Chapter One: The “Us” and the “Others” 
As Hansen points out, constructions of identities happen simultaneously with the 
formulation of foreign policy, and therefore juxtapositions are important to uncover 
(Hansen 2007: 6). The two speeches create narratives and attributes traits to 
identities, that both define the Self while equally differentiating what defines the 
Other. We have categorized two predominant juxtapositions that are present 
throughout the two speeches. The first juxtaposition is the traits, attributes and 
descriptions of what defines “American identity” contradicting what defines the 
“Terrorist identity”. In Brennan’s speech, he paraphrases Obama’s Nobel Peace 
Prize speech, in which Obama states that: 
“Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding 
ourselves to certain rules of conduct.  And even as we confront a vicious 
adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America 
must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.  That is what makes us 
different from those whom we fight.  That is a source of our strength” (A1: 
250-253)13. 
 
John Brennan elaborates on this and repeatedly refers to values that constitute what 
defines an American citizen. Interestingly, however, it is not clearly articulated 
what these values encompass more specifically, but references to common and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!13!Note!our!method!of!referencing!to!appendixes.!A1!is!appendix!one!–!Brennan’s!speech,!A2!is!appendix!two!–!Obama’s!speech.!The!number!indicates!the!line!number!in!the!respective!appendix.!
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inherent values are obvious and constitutive “I am here to say to the American 
people that we will continue to work to safeguard this Nation and its citizens 
responsibly, adhering to the laws of this land and staying true to the values that 
define us as Americans” (A1: 461-463). This is followed up by President Obama 
who refers to the laws that America was founded on, laws that today are still 
fundamental in representing the identity of the American people “For over two 
centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that 
defined who we are as Americans, and served as our compass through every type of 
change” (A2: 7-8). Both the Obama and Brennan articulate a positive process of 
linking constitutive traits that forms the U.S. as a nation and its citizens as a 
population of certain values – even when these traits are not explicitly articulated. 
There are, of course, both explicitly and implicitly articulated representations of 
identity. A very explicit juxtaposition is the notion of reflexive, open and 
transparent American identity as opposed to closed, radical and extreme terrorist 
identity. For instance, Brennan states “We don’t just hear out differing views, we 
ask for them and encourage them.  We discuss.  We debate.  We disagree.  We 
consider the advantages and disadvantages of taking action” (A1: 346-348).  
Brennan continuously underlines how the Administration subscribes to continuous 
evaluation: “Finally, as the President’s counterterrorism advisor, I feel that it is 
important for the American people to know that these efforts are overseen with 
extraordinary care and thoughtfulness” (A1: 361-362). 
This is in direct opposition to how “Deranged or alienated individuals — often U.S. 
citizens or legal residents — can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired 
by larger notions of violent jihad” (A2: 83-85). The representation of an identity as 
having the ability to change is often central in foreign policy. For Hansen, it is 
central to her analysis. She points out that for instance native Indians (and their 
capacity to become Christians), post-Soviet Eastern Europeans (and their capacity 
to become developed Westerns) and people from Balkan (and their capacity to 
become peaceful) are just a few examples of how Other-identities’ capacity (or lack 
of capacity) to change have been discursively established (Hansen 2007: 47ff). 
Interestingly, all of these examples are not only concerned with the inferior 
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identities’ capacity to change, but specifically their capacity to become like the 
articulated superior identity. 
Similarly, the terrorist identity’s capacity to change is also addressed in the 
discourse. It touches on the capacity of change within terrorists, stating that there is 
something inherently, essential in the terrorist identity: “We will never erase the evil 
that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our 
open society” (A2: 55-56). 
When explaining why the chief of external operations for Al-Qaeda on the Arab 
Peninsula (AQAP), Anwar Awlaki, was targeted in a UAV strike, Obama similarly 
stated that “That’s who Anwar Awlaki was — he was continuously trying to kill 
people” (A2: 243). Brennan uses a similar description of inherent destructiveness: 
“[…] there are still terrorists in hard-to-reach places who are actively planning 
attacks against us.  If given the chance, they will gladly strike again and kill more of 
our citizens” (A1: 449-451). In stark contrast stands the representation of American 
identity: “And we must help countries modernize economies, upgrade education, 
and encourage entrepreneurship — because American leadership has always been 
elevated by our ability to connect with people’s hopes, and not simply their fears” 
(A2: 287-289). This is a recurring and indeed central juxtaposition: the destructive 
and murderous terrorists versus the peace-spreading, beneficial American 
government.  
The constitution is not represented in the speeches as merely a document of law, but 
as a nodal point, giving meaning to the essence of being American: “For over two 
centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that 
defined who we are as Americans, and served as our compass through every type of 
change” (A2: 7-8). Being a people of the law is not only historical, but placed as a 
central part of the discourse on UAVs: “We are a nation of laws, and we will always 
act within the bounds of the law” (A1: 281). Abiding to laws is not limited to the 
Constitution, but also important is that “International legal principles, including 
respect for a state’s sovereignty and the laws of war, impose constraints.  The 
United States of America respects national sovereignty and international law” (A1: 
334-336). 
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While it might not be surprising that the Obama administration insists on the 
legality of its actions both domestically and internationally, the repetitions of this 
point are more powerful when juxtaposed against the terrorists that abide to no 
principles, as: “Al Qaeda and its affiliates try to gain foothold in some of the most 
distant and unforgiving places on Earth.  They take refuge in remote tribal 
regions.  They hide in caves and walled compounds.  They train in empty deserts 
and rugged mountains” (A2: 128-130).   Figure 1.4 - Identities 
They are spatially placed outside the 
realm of legality and justice and 
“These terrorists are skilled at 
seeking remote, inhospitable 
terrain—places where the United 
States and our partners simply do 
not have the ability to arrest or 
capture them” (A1: 326-327). This 
model, inspired by Hansen 2007 
summarizes and illustrates how 
identity representations in the 
discourses are juxtaposed: the 
American Self and the Terrorist 
Other. 
 
     
   
History & Identities 
As described previously, these speeches on UAVs are placed in a specific historical 
context. When explicitly interpreted in security discourses, historical events are 
both recontextualized and also lend meaning to current events. As Hodges puts it 
“[n]ational memories of the past are not merely individual memories, but rather 
collective memories […] that can be mined as a source of meaning for new events 
[…]” (Hodges 2011: 30).  Often such memories are used as analogies to the current 
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foreign policy issues. Hodges, for instance, analyses how George W. Bush in his 
speeches paralleled the attack on 9/11 to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Similarly, he 
compared Osama Bin Laden to both Hitler and Stalin. Hodges argues that “ [w]hile 
the present involves inconclusiveness and openness to interpretation and 
evaluation, the collective memory about “the good war” provides a readerly text 
that supplies ready-made understandings” (Hodges 2011: 36).  
Such interpretations of history are also present in the two speeches. Obama asserts 
that America has remained the same, despite the changing nature of the threats: 
“From the Civil War to our struggle against fascism, on through the long twilight 
struggle of the Cold War, battlefields have changed and technology has 
evolved.  But our commitment to constitutional principles has weathered every war, 
and every war has come to an end” (A2: 10-13). The narrative that Americans are a 
constant flagship for freedom despite the transforming nature of the threats they are 
facing, is recurring. 
For instance, Obama reviews the history of terrorist attacks against American 
citizens, and uses them to explain why an active counterterrorism strategy is 
necessary:  
“In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our Embassy in Beirut; at 
our Marine Barracks in Lebanon; on a cruise ship at sea; at a disco in Berlin; 
and on a Pan Am flight — Flight 103  — over Lockerbie.  In the 1990s, we 
lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center; at our military 
facilities in Saudi Arabia; and at our Embassy in Kenya” (A2: 92-95).  
These lessons of history are used to show why a preventive counterterrorism 
strategy is crucial: “These attacks were all brutal; they were all deadly; and we 
learned that left unchecked, these threats can grow.  But if dealt with smartly and 
proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 
9/11” (A2: 95-97). Interestingly enough, however, the threat level does not 
essentially change that America is still at war with Al-Qaeda:  
“But I am certain about one thing.  We are at war. We are at war against a 
terrorist organization called al-Qa’ida that has brutally murdered thousands 
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of Americans—men, women and children—as well as thousands of other 
innocent people around the world. In recent years, with the help of targeted 
strikes we have turned al-Qa’ida into a shadow of what it once was” (A1: 
444-447).  
The use of UAVs is placed within the grander narrative of historical 
counterterrorism, as a necessary means to keep Al-Qaeda in check, if not totally 
eliminating them. And in the discourse, UAVs are a superior alternative to previous 
historical strategies for a variety of reasons:  
“Our efforts must be measured against the history of putting American 
troops in distant lands among hostile populations.  In Vietnam, hundreds of 
thousands of civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were 
blurred.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the extraordinary courage and 
discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have been killed“ (A2: 216-
219). 
 
The Other Other 
As Hansen points out, foreign policy always articulates a Self and a series of 
Others. She makes a distinction between the Radical Other and Other-identities 
constructed. The Radical Other is articulated as being in an antagonistic relationship 
with the Self, an essentially differing force and in foreign policy often with 
threatening characteristics (Hansen 2007: 37ff). As shown previously, the two 
speeches do not lack articulation of Radical Otherness. Foreign policy, however, is 
not only about articulating threats, but also about ascribing meaning to all the actors 
that are not specifically regarded as adversaries or enemies. Therefore, foreign 
policy discourses often articulate a series of less-than-radical Others (Hansen 2007: 
39). A frequent articulation is of a less-than radical Other is the Muslim identity. It 
is often described as having similar characteristics to the Self, the American 
identity, and described as antagonistic to Al-Qaeda: “Al-Qa’ida is the antithesis of 
the peace, tolerance and humanity that is at the heart of Islam” (A1: 101-102). 
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The Muslim Other is recurringly used to describe how support of Al-Qaeda is in 
decline:  
“His propagandist, Adam Gadahn, admitted that they were now seen “as a 
group that does not hesitate to take people’s money by falsehood, detonating 
mosques, [and] spilling the blood of scores of people.”  Bin Laden agreed 
that “a large portion” of Muslims around the world “have lost their trust” in 
al-Qa’ida” (A1: 93-96).  
Brennan intertextualizes these excerpts from Al-Qaedas own documents and asserts 
his own authority and knowledge, while expanding the differentiation between the 
two Others.  
In fact, the Muslim identity is not merely sceptical of Al-Qaeda, it is perhaps as 
threatened by Al-Qaeda as the American identity is: “More broadly, al-Qa’ida’s 
killing of innocents —mostly men, women and children—has badly tarnished its 
image and appeal in the eyes of Muslims around the world” (A1: 91-92). These 
articulations are reminiscent of a previous set of linkage and differentiations in 
American foreign policy discourse, in which Saddam Hussein is articulated as a 
Radical Other and the Iraqi people are articulated as a less-than radical Other, with 
Saddam Hussein as a stable center of the security discourse and with a more 
ambiguous, non-radical Iraqi people, who “[were on the one hand] imbued with a 
proto-democratic, liberal desire linking them to the identity of the USA, but on the 
other hand their captivity under Saddam Hussein implied that the manifestation of 
this desire could only be realized after ‘liberation’ had taken place” (Hansen 2007: 
41). 
While representation of the Muslim Other is also somewhat ambiguous, it is 
distinctly framed as opposed to a misrepresentation of the link:  
“Most, though not all, of the terrorism we faced is fueled by a 
common ideology — a belief by some extremists that Islam is in 
conflict with the United States and the West, and that violence 
against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a 
larger cause.  Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the 
United States is not at war with Islam” (A2: 98-102).  
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Also, the ambiguity of the less radical Muslim Other is perhaps more complex than 
the Iraqi People Other, especially because one articulation of the Muslim Other is 
the specific American Muslim Other, that is represented as a “part of the American 
family”: “In fact, the success of American Muslims and our determination to guard 
against any encroachments on their civil liberties is the ultimate rebuke to those 
who say that we’re at war with Islam” (A2: 326-328). 
As such, the American Muslim identity in a sense acts as a link between the Self 
and the Muslim Other:  
“And the best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists 
is to work with the Muslim American community  — which has consistently 
rejected terrorism — to identify signs of radicalization and partner with law 
enforcement when an individual is drifting towards violence.  And these 
partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a 
fundamental part of the American family” (A2: 322-326).  
 
Linkage between UAVs and Identity 
A final interesting point on the links and differentiations in the representations of 
identity is the way UAV use itself is linked to traits of identity. As Hansen argues, it 
is not possible to make a meaningful demarcation between what is considered 
‘material’ and what is considered constructed or social. She points out that what 
constitutes a tank “[…] is not simply a material assemblage of metal and rubber but 
an object of warfare – or – peacekeeping whose material and social production is 
situated within an abstract discourse of national security […]” (Hansen 2007: 22). 
UAVs can be understood within the discursive frame of the foreign policies, 
policies that are inextricably linked to (and producing) articulations of identity. 
The use of UAVs is similarly – both explicitly and implicitly – linked to American 
identity: “Staying true to our values as a nation also includes upholding the 
transparency upon which our democracy depends” (A1: 121-122). The 
transparency here refers to the speech itself, in which Brennan presents the use of 
UAVs. Similarly, the use of UAVs is attributed with human characteristics, as when 
Brennan simply states “Targeted strikes are wise” (A1: 216). They are so, amongst 
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other reasons, because they are used in accordance with the American value of 
limiting civilian casualties: “[…] one could argue that never before has there been 
a weapon that allows us to distinguish more effectively between an al-Qa’ida 
terrorist and innocent civilians” (A1: 204-205). The articulation of American 
identity as deeply concerned with civilian casualties is specifically used as argument 
for UAV use and for the decision processes regarding UAV use, because they 
enforce this trait. This is an example of how the co-constitutive relation of policy 
and identity is explicitly established:  
“When it does, it pains us and we regret it deeply, as we do any time 
innocents are killed in war.  And when this happens we take it 
seriously.  We go back and review our actions.  We examine our 
practices.  And we constantly work to improve and refine our efforts so that 
we are doing everything in our power to prevent the loss of innocent 
life.  This too is a reflection of our values as Americans” (A1: 395-399).  
This persistent emphasis on minimizing civilian casualties might point to grander 
discursive developments. When Hodges examines the development of what he calls 
the “War on Terror Narrative”, he discerns two competing discourses George Bush 
articulated in the days after 9/11 (Hodges 2011: 27). Because the road was not yet 
paved for the ways in which this event could be talked about, different forms of 
responses were uttered. One was a narrative of the event as a crime, with phrases 
like “victims”, “search is underway”, “law enforcement communities” and “bring 
them to justice” were used. This narrative however, was quickly replaced by a 
narrative of the event as an act of war, where “the enemy attacked”, “acts of war” 
took place and the people who died were “casualties” and George Bush stating that 
“we will win” the “war against terrorism” (ibid.). Since then, the War on Terror 
Narrative has by and large been unchallenged in the official accounts of the 
counterterrorism strategy. Both Brennan and Obama talk about being at war, about 
casualties and especially within the framework of the law: “As a matter of 
international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the 
Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use 
force consistent with our inherent right of national self-defense” (A1: 187-189). 
This general structure of the discourse is widely stable and by and large 
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foundational in the discourse. There is, however, a brief, single divergent 
explanation of UAVs that draw upon a different kind of metaphor. 
Brennan, at one point, describes the traits of the UAV as more medical than 
military: “It’s this surgical precision—the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate 
the cancerous tumor called an al-Qa’ida terrorist while limiting damage to the 
tissue around it—that makes this counterterrorism tool so essential” (A1: 226-229). 
And this might signify a new discursive development for UAVs, one that is more 
congruent with “[…] lengths to which we go to ensure precision and avoid the loss 
of innocent life” (A1: 240-241).  
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Analysis Chapter Two - Claiming the Future 
We find it necessary to analyze how claims of the future are articulated in the two 
speeches because “[…] the future represents an ideologically significant site in 
which dominant political actors and institutions can exert political power and 
control” (Dunmire in Hodges & Nilep 2007: 19). 
America is at war with Al-Qaeda and its associates. It is the central theme in both 
speeches, but in determining the actual status of the war, the efforts so far, and the 
future prospect of the war, the predictions are rather ambiguous. Both Obama and 
Brennan address the great accomplishments of the counterterrorism efforts, after the 
strategically revision of counterterrorism under the Obama Administration: “Today, 
Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants.  There have been 
no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure” (A2: 
35-36). Brennan as well portrays the success, stating that “Today, it is increasingly 
clear that—compared to 9/11—the core al-Qa’ida leadership is a shadow of its 
former self” (A1: 68-69). 
However, despite the clear statements of successful counterterrorism efforts and the 
use of UAVs, Brennan and Obama both holds claims to a future still posing a great 
danger “Despite the great progress we’ve made against al-Qa’ida, it would be a 
mistake to believe this threat has passed” (A1: 103-104). Obama is equally issuing 
a warning “Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists.  From 
Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth” (A2: 39-40). 
Obama goes on to explain these events, not as a success for Al-Qaedas top leaders, 
but as attacks carried out by affiliates and associates, even American citizens, 
driven by the related extremist thoughts:  “So that’s the current threat — lethal yet 
less capable al Qaeda affiliates; threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses 
abroad; homegrown extremists.  This is the future of terrorism” (A2: 87-88). In 
other words, the war is neither over nor won. The threat is still luring and therefore 
the counterterrorism efforts primary goal is to seek the demise of Al-Qaeda: “First, 
we must finish the work of defeating al Qaeda and its associated forces” (A2: 108). 
We see a clear ambiguity in the two competing descriptions of the status of terror 
threats. On one hand, the core of Al-Qaeda is a “shell of its former self”, while it on 
the other hand still poses an imminent threat, continuously recruiting individuals “If 
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given the chance, they will gladly strike again and kill more of our citizens” (A2: 
359-360; A1: 450-451). Therefore, the discourse articulated in the two speeches 
hold two competing narratives of Al-Qaeda’s strength and potential. One Al-Qaeda 
is close to seeing its demise, while the other is finding new roots that are impossible 
to disrupt “We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, 
nor stamp out every danger to our open society” (A2: 55-56). One could argue that 
this dualism in the narrative concerning Al-Qaeda serves as an argument in itself, as 
the continuing threat calls for further responses, while a suffering Al-Qaeda 
narrative serves as the counterterrorism strategy’s seal of approval. This points to a 
continuous risk assessment by the Obama Administration that serves to prove their 
counterterrorism efforts legitimacy, and it certainly distorts the idea and notion of 
what defines war- and peacetime. This will be elaborated further, in the discussion 
chapter. 
 
Claims of Knowledge and Authority 
One important analytical scope to investigate is the way texts explicitly and 
implicitly articulate their authority and how the speakers position themselves as 
knowledgeable: “[…] Political leaders construct their authority in part through 
their right and ability to exercise power” (Hansen 2007: 55). This is important to 
us, as both Brennan and Obama are political leaders, but certainly also makes 
explicit references to their executive roles in foreign policy. Brennan points to his 
reputation, and many years of experiences, in a way that constitutes his position as 
knowledgeable in foreign policy making “I stand here as someone who has been 
involved with our nation’s security for more than thirty years.  I have a profound 
appreciation for the truly remarkable capabilities of our counterterrorism 
professionals—and our relationships with other nations—and we must never 
compromise them” (A1: 159-161). Obama also carefully notes how foreign policy 
brings about unwanted and deadly decisions that are part of his job, a job he intends 
to fulfil:  
“Alongside the decision to put our men and women in uniform in 
harm’s way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups — 
even against a sworn enemy of the United States — is the hardest 
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thing I do as President.  But these decisions must be made, given my 
responsibility to protect the American people” (A2: 256-259). 
Throughout both speeches the planning and formulation of foreign policy is 
described as undergoing extraordinary care and thoughtfulness: “In this fight, we 
are harnessing every element of American power—intelligence, military, 
diplomatic, development, economic, financial, law enforcement, homeland security 
and the power of our values, including our commitment to the rule of law” (A1: 
116-118). Another way in which Brennan and Obama establish their authority is 
their many references to the current terrorist threats. In mapping the situations in 
Yemen, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia - amongst other places - both Obama and 
Brennan establish their knowledge and make their insight explicit.  
An unplanned turn of events regarding authority occurs in the final stage of 
Obama’s speech. Here, a woman in the audience confronts him. While the 
transcripts do not provide a complete picture of the situation, and how it affected 
Obama, we make use of the video-recordings. The female audience member 
interrupts Obama several times. The most significant interruption lasts about a 
minute, and can be found in the video from 53:45-54:50. Here she comments on 
prisoners of Guantanamo, but also the use of UAVs:  AUDIENCE MEMBER: “[…] 
can you take the drones out of the hands of the CIA?  Can you stop the signature 
strikes killing people on the basis of suspicious activities?” (A2: 447-448). Looking 
at the video, Obama tries to regain his ability to speak uninterruptedly. Throughout 
the speech, he presents himself as very calm, and makes use of his rhetoric to put 
emphasis and volume to specific words and sentences. However, the situation seems 
troubling to Obama and for a couple of times he is not able to finish the sentences 
he begins.  Worth noting is that he actively uses the interruption, going off script, to 
address the value of free speech. “Now, ma’am, let me finish.  Let me finish, 
ma’am.  Part of free speech is you being able to speak, but also, you listening and 
me being able to speak.  (Applause.)” (A2: 425-426). This relates to previous 
comments on the transparency and openness inherent in the American Identity: “We 
don’t just hear out differing views, we ask for them and encourage them.  We 
discuss.  We debate.  We disagree.  We consider the advantages and disadvantages 
of taking action” (A1: 346-348).  But the disruption that the member of the 
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audience makes also affects how Obama is claiming his authority and knowledge. 
His choice is to include her in further comments, one could argue, to acknowledge 
and to present himself as a standard bearer for free debates:  
“I’m willing to cut the young lady who interrupted me some slack because 
it’s worth being passionate about.  Is this who we are?  Is that something our 
Founders foresaw?  Is that the America we want to leave our children?  Our 
sense of justice is stronger than that” (A2: 436-439). 
Obama sees the opportunity to involve the situation as part of his arguments. When 
she interrupts him, he seems a bit shook, and tries to gain his foothold again. This is 
something that the transcripts can’t tell but the recordings show. Obama, however, 
immediately intertextualizes her words, and even though he explicitly states that he 
disagree with her comments he makes her a part of his narrative of the War on 
Terror and the American Identity: 
“Our victory against terrorism won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony 
at a battleship, or a statue being pulled to the ground.  Victory will be 
measured in parents taking their kids to school; immigrants coming to our 
shores; fans taking in a ballgame; a veteran starting a business; a bustling 
city street; a citizen shouting her concerns at a President”   (A2: 478-481). 
This interruption is interesting, because it is an unscripted articulation of the 
discourse. The references to openness and wanting peacefulness are themes 
throughout both speeches, and Obama manoeuvres within the same discursive 
patterns when confronted outside of script. 
Numerous references to other agents and institutions are a recurring pattern 
throughout the speeches. These are very important to note, because the 
intertextuality develops the authority of the texts and strengthens it as 
knowledgeable. As Hansen argues: “[…] text are situated within and against other 
texts, that they appropriate as well as revise the past, and that they build authority 
by reading and citing that of others” (Hansen 2007: 55). We have already touched 
upon the intertextuality which Obama and Brennan refer to when they describe the 
careful supervision and bureaucracy every decision to strike is subject to. 
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Furthermore, Brennan makes use of many sources as approval, when determining 
the legality of UAVs: 
“Jeh Johnson, the general counsel at the Department of Defense, has 
addressed the legal basis for our military efforts against al-Qa’ida. 
Stephen Preston, the general counsel at the CIA, has discussed how 
the Agency operates under U.S. law.   These speeches build on a 
lecture two years ago by Harold Koh, the State Department Legal 
Adviser, who noted that “U.S. targeting practices, including lethal 
operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, 
comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war” (A1: 131-
136). 
The excerpt above includes three links to other authorities, which explicitly 
articulates support to the position Brennan wishes to uphold. Brennan is also 
making several references to Obama, citing his speech given in 2009, at his 
acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo (A1: 247-253). Worth noting is also 
Brennan’s initial description of the Woodrow Wilson Center, where the speech was 
held, and its contribution to the national security: “To you and everyone here at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, thank you for your invaluable contributions—your 
research, your scholarship—which help further our national security every day“ 
(A1: 21-23). A remarkable intertextualization in both speeches is quotations from 
documents seized at Operation Geronimo, the killing of Osama bin Laden: “In 
short, al-Qa’ida is losing, badly.  And bin Laden knew it.  In documents we seized, 
he confessed to “disaster after disaster.”  He even urged his leaders to flee the 
tribal regions, and go to places, “away from aircraft photography and 
bombardment” (A1: 64-66). And as Obama cites Osama bin Laden: “To begin with, 
our actions are effective.  Don’t take my word for it.  In the intelligence gathered at 
bin Laden’s compound, we found that he wrote, “We could lose the reserves to 
enemy’s air strikes.  We cannot fight air strikes with explosives.” Other 
communications from al Qaeda operatives confirm this as well“ (A2: 154-157). 
These references serve as powerful intertextual arguments validating the use of 
UAVs.  
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   It has been the scope of this section to map how the future is claimed by two 
dominant political actors in U.S. foreign policy. But claims do not only need 
articulation, construction of identities and formulation of policy, but needs actions 
taken as well. This is a central argument of Hansen, who stress: “For politicians to 
have authority is not only a matter of claiming knowledge – about a conflict, 
national interests, or strategic capabilities- they must also have the ability to take 
responsibility and deploy power” (Hansen 2007: 66f). Brennan addresses Obama’s 
willingness and promise to protection entails that he would not hesitate faced with 
an imminent threat to national security “[…] he would not hesitate to use military 
force against terrorists who pose a direct threat to America.  And he said that if he 
had actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets, including in 
Pakistan, he would act to protect the American people” (A1: 30-33). Importantly, 
Obama and Brennan is not merely defending using UAVs, they are also sending a 
strong signal, that they are willing to use force to protect the security of American 
citizens.  
 
The Things Not Said 
Within discourses, texts and speeches articulate certain points and narratives, but 
what is equally important is what is not being expressed. The two speakers, high 
profile political actors, arguably possess privileged positions in the political 
discourse concerning counterterrorism and the application of UAVs. While 
stressing that the decisions to apply UAV strikes are done with carefulness, caution 
and openness, the levels of transparency has it boundaries “As Commander-in-
Chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and 
our people in the field” (A2: 341-343). And as Brennan puts it: “I will not, nor will I 
ever, publicly divulge sensitive intelligence sources and methods. For when that 
happens, our national security is endangered and lives can be lost” (A1: 162-164). 
They continuously reference what must be kept secret with respects to national 
security. The processes of intelligence gathering are not available to the public, and 
this establishes the privileged position of knowledge both speakers are in: “Again, 
there are some lines we simply will not and cannot cross because, at times, our 
national security demands secrecy” (A1: 431-432). 
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Alternative scenarios 
In depicting the future, and making claims about what strategy is the most 
appropriate response, articulations of alternative solutions are relevant to include, as 
they serve as argumentation of why the current choice of action is the best and most 
suitable (and sometimes even the only) solution “[…] in making proposals about 
the future actions and policies, political actors also make claims, assertions, and 
declarations concerning the future “realities” that give rise to and are implicated 
in those actions” (Dunmire in Hodges & Nilep 2007: 21). 
These alternative solutions are largely influenced by the critique the two speeches 
address, the issue of civilian casualties “[…]much of the criticism about drone 
strikes — both here at home and abroad — understandably centers on reports of 
civilian casualties“ (A2: 187-188). Two alternative scenarios are presented. One is 
to do nothing: 
“To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more 
civilian casualties — not just in our cities at home and our facilities 
abroad, but also in the very places like Sana’a and Kabul and 
Mogadishu where terrorists seek a foothold.  Remember that the 
terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts 
of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties 
from drone strikes.  So doing nothing is not an option” (A2: 197-201). 
The argument above is following the identity construction and juxtapositions 
previously distinguished and analysed. It also entails that the U.S. has a 
responsibility to protect not only U.S. citizens, but people globally. The second 
alternative is to always seek to arrest or capture threatening terrorists. This is 
however again rejected due to another founding characteristic of the identity of 
terrorists: “These terrorists are skilled at seeking remote, inhospitable terrain—
places where the United States and our partners simply do not have the ability to 
arrest or capture them.  At other times, our forces might have the ability to attempt 
capture, but only by putting the lives of our personnel at too great a risk (A1: 326-
329). The risk of losing military personnel is at the centre of this argument, a 
! 47!
problem that is not present when applying UAVs. And finally, this solution is more 
dangerous, more intrusive and more costly than UAVs: “Countries typically don’t 
want foreign soldiers in their cities and towns.  In fact, large, intrusive military 
deployments risk playing into al-Qa’ida’s strategy of trying to draw us into long, 
costly wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-American resentment and inspire 
the next generation of terrorists“ (A1: 232-235). 
!  
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Analysis Chapter Three - Justifications: Why Are UAVs Just? 
 
Legality 
In Brennan’s speech, he proposes seven specific reasons that UAV use is justifiable. 
These are, in order, legality, ethicality, conformation to the principle of necessity, 
conformation to the principle of distinction, conformation to the principle of 
proportionality, conformation to the principle of humanity and finally because they 
are wise. Though not as structured, the Obama speech uses the same patterns of 
justification. First and foremost, they both wish to establish that the use of UAVs is 
legal – it is presented as conditional to discussing whether it is ethical: “Yes, in full 
accordance with the law—and in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United 
States and to save American lives—the United States Government conducts targeted 
strikes against specific al-Qa’ida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted 
aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones” (A1: 172-175). 
As such, UAVs are largely legitimate in legal terms. Obama and Brennan both state 
that the United States is at war with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates: “As a matter of 
international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida, the 
Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use 
force consistent with our inherent right of national self-defense” (A1: 187-189). In 
the above quote Brennan is very clear about the justness being based on the right to 
national self-defense. In terms of legality this is again an intertextual reference to 
article 51 in the United Nation Charter:  
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security” (UN Charter, Ch. 7, 
Art. 51).  
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The above reference is interesting when article 51 is analysed more carefully. The 
above all formulation in the Charter of the United Nations, chapter 7, is arguably 
the safeguarding and, when appropriate, reestablishment of international peace and 
security. It is therefore a point of interest for us, when Brennan and Obama make 
implicit references to the United Nation Charter and international law. These points 
are connected to the narrative of terrorists, Al-Qaeda and its associates that is 
articulated as not only posing a huge threat to the safety of the American people, but 
to the international community as well. “In North and West Africa, another al-
Qa’ida affiliate, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, continues its efforts to 
destabilize regional governments and engages in kidnapping of Western citizens for 
ransom activities designed to fund its terrorist agenda” (A1: 85-88). Therefore the 
justifications of UAVs are not solely founded on protecting U.S citizens, but the 
whole world: “We are at war against a terrorist organization called al-Qa’ida that 
has brutally murdered thousands of Americans—men, women and children—as well 
as thousands of other innocent people around the world” (A1: 444-446). Obama 
equally addresses U.S. responsibility to keep terrorists from destabilizing 
international peace and security. “In Yemen, we are supporting security forces that 
have reclaimed territory from AQAP.  In Somalia, we helped a coalition of African 
nations push al-Shabaab out of its strongholds.  In Mali, we’re providing military 
aid to French-led intervention to push back al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and help the 
people of Mali reclaim their future”(A2: 116-120). The justification is, however, 
not bound to the right to self-defence as it is Obama’s point, that  
“[…] America’s legitimate claim of self-defence cannot be the end of the 
discussion.  To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say 
it is wise or moral in every instance […] And that’s why, over the last four 
years, my administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework 
that governs our use of force against terrorists –- insisting upon clear 
guidelines, oversight and accountability […]” (A2: 166-172).  
The legality is not used as a justification in itself, but it is a decisive presupposition 
for the use. Brennan expands on this point when stating that their standards go 
above and beyond what is expected of international law: “And I would note that 
these standards—for identifying a target and avoiding the loss of innocent 
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civilians—exceed what is required as a matter of international law on a typical 
battlefield.  That’s another example of the high standards to which we hold 
ourselves” (A1: 384-387). The discourse does not only seek to establish the legality 
of UAV use, but that the care and revision of the use is much substantial than 
legality.  
 
UAVs are Ethical 
After establishing the legality of UAV use, Brennan states that “Second, targeted 
strikes are ethical” (A1: L193). This statement is said at 23:23 in the video of the 
speech, followed by a pause for emphasis. In the discourse, this articulation 
establishes the stability of the ethicality. In fact, according to Brennan, the UAVs 
are not only ethical, they are actually ethically required: “[…] I think the American 
people expect us to use advanced technologies, for example, to prevent attacks on 
U.S. forces and to remove terrorists from the battlefield.  We do, and it has saved 
the lives of our men and women in uniform” (A1: 142-144). When the UAVs are 
legal, ethical and superior to any viable alternatives, they are actually not only 
ethical, but the most ethical way of saving lives. Not using them would be unethical 
because they are “[…] absolutely essential to protecting our country and our 
citizens” (A1: 437). 
 
UAVs are Jus in Bello 
Arguably, much of the representations of the identities and the possible future 
scenarios are implicitly concerned with the Just War theory notion jus ad bellum: 
whether the reason for going to war is just. This is established throughout the 
narrative of America being in the self-defence “War on Terror” that was aggravated 
by the Al-Qaeda. The parallel Just War category jus in bello is concerned with how 
military actors should operate in war (see Carsten Stahn: 2007 for a discussion and 
critique of applicability, relevance and practice of jus ad bellum and jus in bello as 
principles). Brennan explicitly references jus in bello principles, when arguing why 
UAVs are ethical: “Here, I think it’s useful to consider such strikes against the 
basic principles of the law of war that govern the use of force” (A1: 194-195). He 
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describes how UAV use conforms to four principles of just war: “Targeted strikes 
conform to the principle of necessity—the requirement that the target have definite 
military value“ (A1: 196-197). In this sense, they might also have been the preferred 
solution in previous military conflicts, because they simply target enemy leaders 
“[…] just as we targeted enemy leaders in past conflicts, such as German and 
Japanese commanders during World War II” (A1: 198:200). 
While both Brennan and Obama several times acknowledge that UAVs indeed have 
resulted in civilian casualties, they both argue that it is actually an unsurpassed 
military tool with regards to minimizing these: “Targeted strikes conform to the 
principle of distinction—the idea that only military objectives may be intentionally 
targeted and that civilians are protected from being intentionally targeted” (A1: 
201-202). Brennan elaborates with even more certainty that “By targeting an 
individual terrorist or small numbers of terrorists with ordnance that can be 
adapted to avoid harming others in the immediate vicinity, it is hard to imagine a 
tool that can better minimize the risk to civilians than remotely piloted aircraft” 
(A1: 208-210). The above quote is equally Brennan’s argument for why UAV use 
conforms to both the principle of humanity and the principle of proportionality. This 
is done throughout the speeches as both Obama and Brennan emphasise that 
targeted strikes only involve high-profile leaders or main planners of terrorist 
activities, while sparing the lives of innocents.  
 
UAVs are Efficient 
A large part of the justification of UAVs is based on the technological benefit they 
are claimed to posses; why alternative weaponry is far less preferable 
“Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones, and are likely 
to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage” (A2: 204-206). Through 
figurative language, Brennan gives credit to the precision of UAV strikes, while 
adding further to the Al-Qaeda narrative: “It’s this surgical precision—the ability, 
with laser-like focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qa’ida terrorist 
while limiting damage to the tissue around it—that makes this counterterrorism tool 
so essential” (A1: 226-229). The imagery used here draws a vivid picture. It 
portrays the horrible traits of Al-Qaeda, which gives connotations to cancer cells, 
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who, if not stopped in time will spread and prove deadly. Here UAVs are again 
justified with its technological attributes that are depicted as clinical and with 
supreme preciseness. In the discourse, UAVs are presented as efficient, and this is a 
recurring point: “[…] one could argue that never before has there been a weapon 
that allows us to distinguish more effectively between an al-Qa’ida terrorist and 
innocent civilians” (A1: 204-205). 
 
UAVs are Wise 
The last point of our analysis is how UAVs are described as wise. Brennan’s own 
formulation is “Targeted strikes are wise” (A1: 216). This is said with strong 
emphasis on “wise”, as the video shows at 25:46. As previously noted, UAVs are 
linked to values that are inherent in the American identity, especially the will to 
always save civilian lives. This not only links UAVs with identity articulations, it 
places its use as the best possible solution because it is wiser than the alternatives, 
to do nothing, or to deploy military personnel on the ground. There are several 
reasons why they are wise, such as time efficiency and their geographical 
advantages given their ability to travel far distances. But most frequent is the 
argument of its justness due to its ability “to dramatically reduce the danger to U.S. 
personnel, even eliminating the danger altogether” (A1: 220-221). This is a 
returning and frequent argument of justness, and the “wise” use of UAVs are 
opposed to scenarios that are depicted as holding far greater consequences:  
“So it is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result 
in civilian deaths or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world.  The 
results would be more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more 
confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in 
support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars” (A2: 209-
212). 
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Analysis: Sub-conclusion 
The discourse of UAVs, as analyzed in the two speeches, holds predominant 
juxtapositions. These juxtapositions construct identities and define a Self and a 
series of Others. In this case the American identity juxtaposed to the terrorist 
identity. The American identity is the United State and the American citizens. This 
identity is articulated as constituted by founding laws, democratic values, 
transparency and openness, and thus seeks to always take extraordinary care and 
proceed with a foreign policy that aims to spread peace. This is juxtaposed to Al-
Qaeda, its terrorists and associates. The identity of terrorists is articulated as a 
violent, closed and extremist group, who have evil lying at their hearts. The terrorist 
identity is the Radical Other, while different Others also are articulated. The 
Muslim identity is constituted in the speeches as less radical, often as, or even more, 
threatened than the American identity by the Radical Others destructiveness. The 
American Muslim identity is equally articulated as a part of the American family 
and this becomes a link between the Self and the Muslim Other. Lastly, UAVs are 
linked to the defining attributes of the American Identity. Brennan and Obama 
constitute UAVs with human characteristics that are in accordance with values and 
foundation of the American nation. From our epistemological stance material 
objects are not merely material, but subject to the social discursiveness. The fact 
that UAVs are subject to, and included in, the narrative of the American identity 
illustrates the co-constitutive relation between identity and foreign policies.  
   The discourse analyzed holds claims to the future. These are presented with 
ambiguity. The narrative of the potential and current status of Al-Qaeda and the 
terrorist threat is both presented as highly weakened due to the counterterrorism 
efforts, but also as a threat that can still prove imminent. This is related to the 
identity of the terrorists that are inherently evil at heart. We analyze this ambiguity 
as an argument used to serve the legitimacy of both previous and future use of 
UAVs. Obama and Brennan make claims of knowledge and authority. They refer to 
their responsibility, given their position, and their experiences in foreign policy 
making. They demonstrate this through a recurring mapping of the field of terrorist 
threats throughout the world. Intertextuality is used repeatedly to support their 
decision. These include, among others, references to personals at the Department of 
! 54!
Defense, CIA, legal advisors, international law documents and documents seized 
during Operation Geronimo.  
The justification of UAVs are based on that its use is legal, ethical, efficient while 
conforming to the principles of jus in bello. Firstly, Obama’s and Brennan’s 
justifications are focused on its legality, with intertextual references to national and 
international law. This is a decisive presupposition, but not solely the justification 
for the use of UAVs. Secondly, arguments are made that UAVs are ethical while 
being efficient. They structure their argumentation on the UAVs appropriateness, 
due to its ability to limit civilian casualties and saving, not solely American, lives 
from the violence of jihad. Thirdly, UAVs are justified as weaponry that conforms 
to jus in bellum principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction and humanity. 
!  
! 55!
Discussion: Blurred Lines  
“The ultimate trade awaiting its ultimate practitioner. That is the way it was and 
will be. That way and not some other way.” 
Cormack McCarthy, Blood Meridian, 1985 
 
In this discussion, we wish to amass our empirical findings and use our 
interpretation of the changing nature of warfare to establish a central argument 
about the UAV discourse and its role in the grander leitmotif of military conflict. 
We will draw upon our analytical points to discuss to what degree the role of UAVs 
in foreign policy represents a part of the distortion of the distinction between 
wartime and peacetime. Finally, we will briefly discuss how literature on the 
theoretical notion of the Risk Society and its practice of military action might be 
used to place the UAV discourse within a grander academic framework. 
 
Picking Up From New Wars 
In many ways, Brennan and Obama articulate UAVs as the epitome of a foreign 
policy that has moved away from Old War notions. In the narrative of UAVs, this 
change is initiated by Al-Qaeda and started on 9/11: “This was a different kind of 
war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target” 
(A2: 21-22).  
The UAVs have a central part in the narrative of counterterrorism, but they are not 
isolated from the grander narrative of national security, freedom and the future of 
America. The UAVs are one piece to the puzzle of emerging from “the battle of 
ideas” victorious: “We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a 
battle of ideas.  So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy” (A2: 125-127).  
Many of these components relate in different ways to the typological 
differentiations Kaldor makes between New and Old Wars. One of her key claims is 
that the previous dichotomous relationships between internality and externality, 
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aggression and repression, local and global are no longer apt to describe and 
understand current military conflict. 
Not only is the use of UAVs practically global, but the grand counterterrorism 
strategy has a global perspective to it as well. Because terrorists can emerge from 
anywhere in the world, the risk assessment and prevention must be equally global:  
“Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend 
fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent for what we 
spent in a month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training 
security forces in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel 
and its neighbors, feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in 
Pakistan, and creating reservoirs of goodwill that marginalize 
extremists.  That has to be part of our strategy” (A2: 362-369).  
As such, the foreign policy articulated in the UAV discourse has no obvious spatial 
constraints. The strategy of marginalizing extremists does not take place on a pre-
defined battlefield but must be flexible and efficient wherever the threats might 
arise. Naturally, this strategy of prevention also blurs the lines of military measures 
as temporally delineated. When it is not clearly defined who the enemy is (or if 
potential enemies will even become enemies), where the enemy is or how the 
enemy should be handled, the constant assessment of the threats are not defined 
within a certain timeframe: “So the next element of our strategy involves addressing 
the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism — from North Africa to 
South Asia” (A2: 337-338). 
The discourse does offer one promise of temporal limitation, that is specifically 
concerned with the continuous nature of the current strategy: “We cannot use force 
everywhere that a radical ideology takes root; and in the absence of a strategy that 
reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war — through drones or Special 
Forces or troop deployments — will prove self-defeating, and alter our country in 
troubling ways” (A2: 332-336). So it seems that even if UAVs are currently the 
superior option, they cannot continue to be so forever. 
Besides the spatial and temporal distortions of UAV use, another way the UAV 
discourse relates to the New War concepts is the way different kinds of actors are 
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involved. While the American government is currently the only actor using UAVs, 
they are still seen as a part of a foreign policy involving local, regional and 
international actors that are both state and non-state: 
“In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries.  Already, 
thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists.  In Yemen, 
we are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP.  In 
Somalia, we helped a coalition of African nations push al-Shabaab out of its 
strongholds.  In Mali, we’re providing military aid to French-led intervention to 
push back al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and help the people of Mali reclaim their 
future” (A2: 136-142).  
And these military involvements are not discursively different from the peace-
building in other countries, but rather two sides of the same coin: “This means 
patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt and Tunisia and 
Libya — because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will serve as a 
rebuke to violent extremists” (A2: 282-284).  
The distinction between war time and peace time has been discussed in previous 
accounts of foreign policy discourse analysis. Annita Lazar and Michelle M. Lazar, 
for instance, analyze security policy speeches made by George H. Bush and Bill 
Clinton. In these, Bush states that “We are the only nation on the Earth that could 
assemble the forces of peace” and Clinton that “[…] no campaign for peace can 
succeed without determination to fight terrorism” (As quoted by Lazar & Lazar in 
Hodges & Nilep (eds.) 2007: 57). In their analysis, Lazar and Lazar simply dismiss 
these phrases as Orwellian “double speak”. They state that such description of 
foreign policy measures are signs of a paradoxical and incongruent discourse (ibid.). 
While we agree that it is certainly important to discuss whether there are 
discrepancies (or outright lies) between state officials’ claims and observable 
empirical phenomena, we would argue that simply dismissing these phrases as 
“double speak” is setting aside the ways discourse of American foreign policy 
actually relates to the practice of military conflict according to the New War 
conceptualizations. As Brennan shows, the discourse draws on a multitude of 
components, not easily discerned from each other: “In this fight, we are harnessing 
every element of American power—intelligence, military, diplomatic, development, 
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economic, financial, law enforcement, homeland security and the power of our 
values, including our commitment to the rule of law” (A1: L116-128). 
 
The Characteristics of UAVs 
The novelty of UAVs as a phenomenon is not stabilized in the discourse. We 
previously analyzed how Al-Qaeda is simultaneously a constant threat and a threat 
in decline. Similarly, the discourse articulates UAVs as both a new phenomenon, 
changing the circumstances of military action, and as a slight modification of 
previous strategies. Obama mentions that the emergence of the threat has changed, 
even if the essence of the threat has not: “As I said earlier, this threat is not 
new.  But technology and the Internet increase its frequency and in some cases its 
lethality.  Today, a person can consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to 
a violent agenda, and learn how to kill without leaving their home” (A2: 390-393). 
Often times, the debate on UAV warfare (and the debate on New Wars) boils down 
to whether the UAV as a military tool is a new military weapon. This is to say, does 
the UAV revolutionize the military practice? Does the UAV have technological 
capabilities and military potentials that previous weapons did not? We’ve been 
following the (quite absent) Danish debate on UAV use, and these are questions 
often posed. Anders Henriksen and  Jens Ringsmose’s report on UAVs ”Dronerne 
er her!: Strategiske, retlige og etiske konsekvenser” also ask these questions, and 
state that UAVs ”[s]at på spidsen[...] ikke [er] andet end krydsermissiler, der kan 
anvendes flere gange og med større præcision” (Henriksen & Ringsmose 2013: 7). 
According to Henriksen and Ringsmose, the UAVs are a natural development of an 
asymetrical war and as representing a feature that has always been a part of war: 
“[m]ilitærteknologisk overlegenhed – og muligheden for at kunne anvende væbnet 
magt som politisk instrument med minimal risiko for tab – har altid påvirket 
beslutningstagernes villighed til at gå i krig” (Henriksen & Ringsmose 2013: 23). 
Our empirical findings and subsequent discussion allow us to critique these 
positions. We believe that regarding UAVs as nothing but a “better” cruise missile 
is vastly underestimating the social practices of weapon use. The development of 
any given weapons is susceptible to the assessments of who the enemy is, how the 
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enemy acts, which spatial and temporal conditions the predicted battle field is 
governed by, how the overall security strategy in given scenarios is as well as 
contingent on the political environment at the given time. Not only the 
development, but also the practice of using a weapon, is contingent on perceptions 
of the how’s, why’s, who’s, and when’s of the war and how these are expected to 
develop. Therefore, we argue that the idea of assessing to what degree UAVs are 
causing a revolution in military practice is somewhat missing the point. UAVs are 
co-constitutive, they are caused by and cause both identity productions and policy 
development simultaneously, and it is not meaningful to regard UAVs as a 
phenomenon unrelated to the cultural and social context it is used and developed 
within. 
Conceptually, similar military methods might have been used occasionally in 
previous warfare. It does, however, challenge traditional conceptualizations, when 
the administration of “the world’s most powerful nation” begins to articulate use of 
UAVs as a superior military tool (A2: 378). Similarly, the anticipation of 
widespread adoption of UAV use implies that the newness of the UAV 
characteristics will be developed further. As Rasmussen puts it, it “[…] is no longer 
a question of technology. Cavalry, tanks and stealth bombs are all understood 
within a new strategic framework, in which case it does not matter whether the 
technology is new, because every weapons system can be used in a new context” 
(Rasmussen 2006: 65). 
As such, we do not regard the newness of the UAVs as an ahistorical claim of 
originality of the UAVs’ features, but rather as a move toward aptly understanding 
the development of the discursive fields military conflict happen within. On the 
contrary, we regard claims that UAVs “[…] kommer efter vores opfattelse heller 
ikke til at ændre grundlæggende på krigens natur” (Henriksen & Ringsmose 2013: 
47) as rather ahistorical: as we’ve tried to show, the ”nature of war” is always 
contingent and contextual, and not determined by one technological advancement or 
another. 
On many levels, the characteristics ascribed to UAV use seem to represent a further 
distortion of Old War distinctions between war and peace, perhaps even distorting 
the traditional distinctions in ways the New War framework has not anticipated. 
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This is specifically concerning the way powerful states engage in managing 
perceived threats, the further distortion of spatial and temporal distinctions of 
military action and the way military efforts are inextricably linked to parallel peace 
development efforts. 
 
A Perspective: UAVs as New War Risk Assessment 
As we’ve previously mapped, the UAV discourse places UAVs as the final military 
decision against terrorist threats, but a decision taken parallel with steps towards 
demarginalization, along with diplomatic, economic and development efforts, and 
after careful intelligence gathering and investigation. Many articulations in the 
discourse are focused on assessing the level of a certain threat and then exercising 
the necessary measures. Therefore we argue that the UAV discourse can actually be 
interpreted in the perspective of theories of the Risk Society. While time and space 
constraints do not permit an exhaustive analysis of this perspective, it might serve 
as an interesting scope through which the security policy discourse – and with this, 
the UAV discourse – might be interpreted. Much has been written on the how the 
Risk Society engages in military action. It is especially concerned with how 
societies band together against perceived risks, how these risks are sought handled 
preemptively and how society mobilizes around them. Concerning war and security 
policy it is specifically concerned with how perceptions of risk are rooted in policy 
makers’ language as well as policy making (see for instance Amoore & de Goede  
2008, Coker 2009, Heng 2006 and Rasmussen 2006). We believe that this 
discussion can contribute profoundly to broadening our understanding of the UAV 
discourse. 
Rasmussen, for instance, discusses how modern anti-terror measures are intertwined 
with the structure of the state and that new military technology “ […] probably 
reinforces the tendency to think of war as a rational enterprise managed by a 
bureaucracy because information technologies hold the promise of a battlefield lit 
up by the light of reason – a battlefield that suits the bureaucratic mind perfectly” 
(Rasmussen 2006: 157). This is a potent observation considering the emphasis in 
the speeches on the careful review and decision making process of UAV use. 
Rasmussen also discusses the identity reproductions of the Risk Society: “[…] the 
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enemy cannot be seen as an innocent means doing his government’s bidding, as 
soldiers previously was seen. ‘If our enemy is not like us, then what is he like?’ 
Following 9/11, this question has been answered with reference to three different 
conceptions of the terrorist’s rationality: he is irrational, of a different rationality, 
or perfectly rational but evil” (Rasmussen 2006: 159). As Rasmussen later points 
out, the American security discourse has widely established the enemy as “evil”, a 
trait repeatedly attributed by both Brennan and Obama. 
The risk literature is similarly concerned with the distortions of temporality. It is 
argued that because of the constant assessment of future scenarios and adaptation to 
these, the future is already part of the present in small glimpses:  
“When trained on risks that are deemed unquantifiable and dangers that are 
considered unknowable, surveillance, profiling, policing, and 
criminalization become something other than knowledge practices – perhaps 
what might be better termed forays into the unknown. Before the unknown 
is entered, however, it must first be produced. This is accomplished through 
a time warp of sorts, in which future yet unspecified dangers are made ever 
present, and in which future yet unspecified dangers are made ever present 
[…]” (Coutin in Amoore & de Goede 2008: 218).  
Seen in the perspective of risk literature, the speeches’ emphasis on internalizing 
possible, yet somewhat unknowable futures underlines the analytical point, that the 
future is something fought on a discursive battleground. Internalizing scenarios of 
the future to the present is constantly happening and very much used for 
legitimizing current political decisions14. 
This also lends some perspective to the oft cited words of Donald Rumsfeld: “... 
there are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known 
unknowns; that is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But 
there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don't 
know”(U.S. Department of Defense 2002)15. In this context, these words serve both !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14!One!is!reminded!of!William!Gibson’s!famous!words:!“The!future!is!already!here,!it!is!just!unevenly!distributed”.!!15!Transcript!of!the!news!briefing!can!be!found!at:!www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636!
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as a status on the intelligence reports at the time and as a meta-analysis of the 
governing categories of knowledge. 
Obama’s description of the future is one in which a dismantled Al-Qaeda leadership 
is replaced by the threat of homegrown extremists – not necessarily more safe and 
not necessarily less safe: “So that’s the current threat — lethal yet less capable al 
Qaeda affiliates; threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad; homegrown 
extremists. This is the future of terrorism” (A2: 103-105).  
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Conclusion 
“A screaming comes across the sky. It has happened before, but there is nothing to 
compare it to now.” 
Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 1973 
 
Throughout this project, we have mapped the discourse of UAV use as presented by 
the American government in two speeches by John Brennan and Barack Obama. 
We have presented a brief historical context to justifications and theories of war. 
Afterwards, we used the methodology of discourse analysis to investigate how the 
use of UAVs is structured with regards to articulations of identity and how future 
scenarios are internalized in current policy making. We have discussed the 
justifications of UAV use and how they relate to theories of just war, specifically 
the jus ad bellum and jus in bello frameworks. Furthermore, we have discussed the 
findings with regards to the distortions of traditional theoretical dichotomies in the 
Old War / New War discussion. We have also used the approach of discourse 
analysis to discuss the current Danish UAV debate. Finally, we have briefly touched 
upon how the UAV discourse might be interpreted within the grander notion of the 
Risk Society. We will present these findings in this conclusion. 
With regards to Hansen’s analysis of the co-constitutive relationship between 
identity and foreign policy articulation, we have identified articulations of a Self 
and of several Others. The primary juxtaposition of identities is between the identity 
of the American Self and the identity of the Terrorist Other. The American identity 
is articulated as being law-abiding, reflexive, constantly preventing loss of life and 
adherent to constitutional values, whereas the terrorist Al-Qaeda is murderous, 
radical, deranged and hiding in the most unforgiving places on earth. These identity 
articulations are connected to the practice of UAV use – preventing evil terror plots, 
striking even in inhospitable terrains. Additionally, a less-than radical Other is 
articulated, the Muslim American. This identity is represented as similar, but not 
identical to the American Self. The practice of UAV use is also itself linked to 
certain traits, illustrating how material phenomenon are understood, articulated and 
used within social, discursive frames. 
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Secondly, we analyze how both speeches make claims about the future, and how 
they relate to the use of UAVs. The threat and enemy perceptions of the future are 
articulated ambiguously. Sometimes, it is argued that Al-Qaeda is an organization in 
decline, while at other times they are a constant threat. Sometimes America cannot 
be engaged in a perpetual war, while at other times, the evil in the hearts of the 
terrorists cannot be erased. Our analysis shows that these different claims of the 
future are used to respectively legitimize the previous use of UAVs and the future 
use of UAVs. 
The use of UAVs is repeatedly established as ethical. With reference to the 
domestic and international legality, the war on terror is argued a ‘just war’. With 
explicit references to the principles of the jus in bello framework, the use of UAVs 
are argued to be ethical according to all standards of warfare. It also implied that the 
efficiency, risk-minimizing, and threat averting abilities of the UAVs are superior to 
the alternatives and actually ethically preferable. 
These three analytical categories give insight in the structure of the UAV discourse. 
The legitimacy and necessity of UAV used is specifically built on the way 
identities, future scenarios and ethicality are articulated. 
In our discussion, we present the argument that the central parts of the UAV 
discourse are congruent with the transformation of warfare the New War-theory 
argues. This is specifically concerned the dichotomous distinctions of local/global, 
the distortion of the clearly defined spatial and temporal boundaries of war and the 
type of actors engaged in the military conflict. 
We also present, with a nod to our epistemological position, an argument against the 
causal understanding of UAVs as either resulting in a revolution of military warfare 
or simply being ‘better’ cruise missiles. Instead, we argue that UAVs are not only 
causing, but also caused by changing perceptions of who and what the enemy is. 
The relationship between identity and policy is co-constitutive, and by regarding 
UAVs as a technological, material object outside of the context it is being used in, 
one risks oversimplifying the grander, discursive movements that govern how 
warfare is understood and practiced.           
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